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Devolution in Wales: between economic constraint and political opportunity  
 
The UK experience and in particular the case of Wales, raises doubts regarding any 
mechanical effect of re-centralization through the economic crisis. Drawing on an 
interview panel of 26 stakeholders interviewed between October 2012 and July 2013 
( representing three main groups, namely devolved government, professional and 
policy communities, and elected representatives at the devolved level), the paper 
examines devolution in Wales in relation to the key themes identified in the foreword: 
the experience of fiscal discipline related to the crisis; the impact of the European 
Union; State restructuring and the major challenges identified by the regional decision 
makers. The UK’s position outside of the Eurozone has meant that Wales has not 
been subject to the “hard” convergence pressures which have increasingly 
constrained sub-national actors across Europe. Although Wales has faced increasing 
economic constraints and fiscal pressures akin to “hard” convergence due to the UK 
Government’s austerity programme, it was able to shelter local public services in the 
short term. Further, the economic crisis has acted as a catalyst for the opening of 
policy windows in terms of both the development of devolution and the reform of public 
services. Welsh decision-makers attempted to make good use of the crisis and to 
demonstrate that the devolved authorities could manage change. 
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Introduction  
 
The rescaling of responsibilities and functions from the national level to the regional 
or sub-national level via processes of devolution or decentralisation has been 
characterised as a global phenomenon (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill 2003; Lidström 
2007; Lobao et al. 2009). These processes have unsurprisingly attracted interest from 
across disciplines, perhaps most notably in geography via debates around state 
rescaling and the interplay of territories, places, scales and networks and in political 
science via the analysis of territorial politics and the influential, yet slippery, concept 
of multi-level governance (Brenner 2004; Jessop 2007; MacLeod & Jones 2007; 
Jessop et al. 2008; Mitchell 2009; Bradbury 2010; Birrell 2012; Bache and Flinders 
2005; Piattoni 2010). In the UK, the introduction of devolution by the Labour 
government in the late 1990s significantly recast territorial governance. Increasingly 
the traditional caricature of the UK as a highly centralised, unitary state has been 
replaced by models such as a ‘quasi-federal state’ or ‘state of unions’ (Mitchell 2009; 
Bradbury 2006; Bogdanor 2003; Gamble 2006). Further, Jeffery (2007, p.101) notes 
that the piecemeal and asymmetric nature of devolution in the UK has meant that there 
has been no defined limits to ‘constitutional tinkering’ or where ‘the boundaries of 
legitimate devolved aspirations lie in the context of a shared statehood.’ The 18 
September 2014 referendum on Scottish Independence, for example, exposed the 
political dynamics inherent within this and has driven reinvigorated calls for enhanced 
devolution in Wales and a desire to provide ‘a decisive answer’ to the English Question 
(Cameron 2014).    
 
The key question addressed within this paper focuses on the extent to which the sub-
national actors that have emerged from these wider global or European-wide 
processes of devolution or decentralisation, in this case Wales, have been able to 
pursue a distinctive policy response to the financial crisis. In many senses this 
question is related to the renewed interest in the ability of small states to survive and 
potentially thrive within the context of the global financial crisis (Moses 2013; Verdun 
2013). Much of this literature draws on the work of Katzenstein (1985) which noted 
that although small European states are highly dependent on global markets and 
vulnerable to economic shocks, they are also potentially quite resilient through their 
ability to draw on different forms of democratic corporatism. He argues that this 
3 
 
democratic corporatism has three core traits: ‘an ideology of social partnership 
expressed at the national level; a relatively centralised and concentrated system of 
interest groups; and voluntary and informal co-ordination of conflicting objectives 
through continuous political bargaining between interest groups, state bureaucracies 
and political parties’ (Katzenstein 1985, p.32). Verdun (2013, p.280) argues that the 
underlying assumption shared by Katzenstein and contemporary commentators, such 
as Bohle (2011), is that ‘small states are often more dynamic than large states in 
responding to a crisis’. However, early assessments of the response of small states to 
the financial crisis have highlighted the diversity of both experiences and responses 
and demonstrate that these ‘states do not have access to any sort of magic bullet or 
special ability to adjust by virtue of their size alone’ (Moses 2013, p.273). 
 
This article examines these themes by applying the ‘States of Convergence’ typology 
proposed in the introduction to this special edition. In order to explore ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
forms of convergence and divergence, the paper focuses on the experience of fiscal 
discipline related to the crisis; the potential impact of measures at the UK and 
European Union levels; the ongoing processes of state restructuring and the specific 
challenges and opportunities identified by regional decision-makers. The paper draws 
on an analysis of official documents and semi-structured interviews with a panel of 25 
stakeholders carried out between November 2012 and July 2013 (See Appendix 1). 
This panel was drawn from three main cognate groups: devolved government; 
professional and policy communities; and elected representatives at the devolved 
level. These interviews were all recorded, fully transcribed, analysed and quotes are 
used to identify key issues highlighted by this analysis.  
 
The paper is divided into four sections. Part one introduces devolution in Wales and 
briefly explores key dimensions of territorial governance and political capacity which 
provide the context for the analysis of the territorial response to the financial crisis. 
Part two examines the impact of the financial crisis in terms of the economic 
constraints driven by the UK Government’s austerity measures and the response to 
these measures by the Welsh Government and other key policy actors in Wales. Part 
three analyses the political opportunities which have emerged following the financial 
crisis and focuses on two parallel reform agendas: the further devolution of powers to 
Wales and the reform of public services and local government within Wales. The article 
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concludes by returning to the common question: ‘Is there a coherent territorial model, 
a repertoire of collective action to deal with the economic crisis’ and considering the 
implications of the recent 2015 General Election for the themes identified in the paper. 
 
Territorial Governance and Political Capacity in Wales 
 
The case of devolution in the UK provides a very different context for analysing 
territorial responses to the financial crisis when compared to the small states 
considered by Verdun (2013) and the regions examined elsewhere within this special 
edition. The UK’s position outside the Eurozone and status as a non-signatory to the 
Fiscal Compact has meant that many of variables identified as driving ‘hard 
convergence’ are simply absent or at least weakened for sub-national actors within 
the UK. However, the direction of travel within the UK has been broadly similar and 
the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition elected in 2010 pursued an austerity 
agenda akin to that adopted in many Eurozone states. The ability of the Welsh 
Government and the wider range of actors engaged in policy-making within Wales to 
develop a coherent territorial model in response to this austerity agenda and the wider 
global economic crisis has clearly been shaped by the character of territorial 
governance and political capacity within Wales. There is a rich tradition of the 
measurement of sub-state territorial power and capacity in political science, most 
recently highlighted by the influential Regional Authority Index developed by Hooghe 
et al. (2010) and Hooghe et al. (2016). This paper briefly introduces three dimensions 
of territorial political capacity which provide the context for Wales’ response to the 
financial crisis: institutional resources, economic resources and finally 
intergovernmental and fiscal relations.  
 
i) Institutional resources 
 
The approach to devolution adopted by successive UK Governments has lacked a 
clear, coherent vision and has instead been characterised by ad-hoc reform and 
incrementalism (Jeffrey 2007; Birrell 2012). This incrementalism has been exemplified 
in the Welsh case, which has more than matched the oft-quoted observation by Ron 
Davies (1999), the former Secretary of State for Wales, that Welsh devolution is ‘a 
5 
 
process not an event’. The model of Welsh devolution evolved from a limited form of 
‘executive devolution’ established by the Government of Wales Act 1998,  to the ability 
to make primary legislation within the twenty devolved policy areas without reference 
to Westminster following a referendum in March 2011 (Stafford 2011; Navarro and 
Lambert 2007). However, the post-referendum arrangements continued the limited 
conferred powers model or ‘devolution by inclusion’ rather than the reserved powers 
model or general legislative competence which has characterised devolution in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland (Miers 2011, p.32). Therefore the model of devolution 
that has evolved within Wales has remained comparatively weak in terms of both of 
the self-rule – ‘the authority that a subnational government exercises in its own 
territory’ – and shared-rule – ‘the authority that a subnational government co-exercises 
in the country as a whole’ - dimensions identified by the Regional Authority Index 
(Hooghe et al. 2016, p.23 – see Tables 1 and 2). The relative weakness of devolution 
in Wales, specifically in relation to ‘shared rule’ indicators, suggests that we might 
expect it to be potentially prone to being shaped directly or indirectly by ‘hard’ 
convergence factors, for example, top-down controls on public expenditure. 
 
Table 1: Regional Authority Index: Self Rule in Wales  
 
 Institutional 
Depth 
(0-3) 
Policy 
Scope 
(0-4) 
Fiscal 
Autonomy 
(0-4) 
Borrowing 
Autonomy 
(0-3) 
Representation Self-
rule 
Assembly 
(0-2) 
Executive 
(0-2) 
1964–1998 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1999–2010 2 3 0 1 2 1 9 
 
Source: Hooghe et al. (2016), P.417. 
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Table 2: Regional Authority Index: Shared Rule in Wales  
 
 Law-making 
(All 0.5) 
Executive 
Control 
(0-2) 
Fiscal 
Control 
(0-2) 
Borrowing 
Control 
(0-2) 
Constitutional 
Reform 
(Both 0-4) 
 
Shared 
- rule 
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 M B M B M B M B 
1964– 
1998 
0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
1999– 
2007 
0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 6.5 
2008-
2010 
0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 6.5 
 
Note: National legislature has: L1=regional representation; L2=regional government representation; 
L3=majority regional representation; L4=extensive authority; L5=bilateral regional consultation; L6=veto 
for individual region. Total for shared rule is either multilateral (M) or bilateral (B). 
 
Source: Hooghe et al. (2016), P.418. 
 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the introduction of full party political incongruence 
following the 2010 General Election did little to slow the development of the devolved 
settlement in Wales and in many senses the pace of change actually accelerated. In 
October 2011, for example, the Coalition Government established the all-party 
Commission on Devolution in Wales – or the Silk Commission as it became known - 
to explore the case for the devolution of fiscal powers and the transfer of further 
legislative powers to the Assembly. In response to the recommendations made by the 
Commission in its two reports (2012, 2014) the UK Government transferred several 
minor taxes (stamp duty, business rates & landfill tax), agreed in principle to a future 
referendum on the transfer of income tax powers and a move to a reserved powers 
model. These reforms were characterised as providing ‘a more coherent, stable and 
better functioning devolution settlement for Wales: one that works in the interests of 
Wales and of the United Kingdom as a whole’ (HM Government 2015, p.12). However, 
Cole and Stafford (2015, p.13) observe that although the trajectory of devolution 
suggests that the ‘self-rule’ dimension in Wales may shift upwards, the ‘shared rule’ 
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dimension will remain relatively weak unless there is a systematic overhaul of the UK 
State. 
 
ii) Economic resources 
 
The relative economic resources of a territory can be seen as a key element of the 
‘material’ dimension of territorial governance and political capacity (Cole and Stafford 
2015, p.15). In common with many similar regions across Europe, the story of the 
Welsh economy over the past decades has been one of transition from an economy 
heavily dependent on heavy industry and raw materials, primarily coal and steel, to a 
more diversified manufacturing and service-based economy (Pickernell 2011). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the significant challenges created by this transition, the 
economic performance has continued to struggle despite decades of assistance via 
the creation of development agencies, the introduction of devolution and Objective 
One funding from the European Union. Ball (2008, p.2), for example, argues that the 
truth is that Wales ‘is a stagnant, backward, failed part of the British regional economy’ 
and only a radical shift in policy will break this ‘vicious circle of decline and decay.’ The 
relative performance of the Welsh economy can be illustrated via simple performance 
indicators such as Gross Value Added (GVA) per head (Figures 1). Whilst Wales 
outperforms several English regions in some indicators, such as unemployment rates, 
it is important to note that Wales remains disproportionately reliant on public sector 
employment and therefore at risk in terms of further austerity-driven reforms. 
Furthermore, Huggins and Thompson’s (2013) analysis of a range of input, output and 
outcome factors related to competitiveness appears to indicate that over the past 
decade Wales has failed to close the gap between itself and the majority of the UK 
(Figure 2). Therefore the economic challenges facing Wales and its relative 
dependency on public spending demonstrates its limited economic resources which 
potentially constrain public and private actors from pursuing divergent public policy 
underpinned by a distinctively Welsh territorial model. Indeed, one of the criticisms of 
the Welsh Government’s policies in the early years of devolution was its tendency to 
adopt a precautionary approach to economic development (Cooke and Clifton 2005).  
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Figure 1: GVA per head index (UK=100) 
 
Source: Regional Labour Market Statistics, May 2014 
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Figure 2: UK Competitiveness Index 2006-2013 
 
 
Sources: Huggins and Thompson (2013); Huggins and Day (2006) 
 
iii) Intergovernmental & Fiscal Relations 
 
A key area of territorial political capacity highlighted by the Regional Authority Index 
(Hooghe et al. 2016) and wider studies of regional political capacity (Cole 2006; Cole 
and Pasquier 2015; Pasquier 2015) has been the relations between levels of 
government and in particular the fiscal capacity of regional actors. In terms of the latter, 
Wales has been historically weak, both in terms of fiscal autonomy (the extent to which 
a regional government can independently tax its population) and fiscal control (the 
extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of national tax 
revenues). The Welsh Government receives a block grant made up of the 
Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL), a fixed budget calculated by the UK 
Government over a three year spending review period, and Annually Managed 
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led – such as welfare, tax credits or public sector pensions. The system for allocating 
the DEL rests on the Barnett formula, which calculates changes to the Welsh DEL on 
a population-based proportion of the changes in planned spending on comparable 
government functions in England. For example, a hypothetical £100 million increase 
in spending for a UK Government department which had 75 per cent of its functions 
devolved to Wales would lead to an increase in the DEL of £4.28 million, based on 
Office for National Statistics population estimates of the Welsh population being 5.71 
per cent of the English population.  
 
These arrangements have been the subject of a wide range of reviews at both the 
devolved and UK levels and prompted much academic debate (House of Commons 
Treasury Select Committee 1997; Commission on Scottish Devolution 2009; 
Independent Commission on Funding and Finance for Wales 2009, 2010; House of 
Lords Select Committee on the Barnett Formula 2009; Commission on Devolution in 
Wales 2012). Trench identifies three main strands of criticism that have emerged 
within these debates, firstly, that the calculation of resources has little to do with 
relative need or equity, secondly that funding levels are decided unilaterally by the UK 
Treasury and finally that the devolved administrations are relegated to being ‘not much 
more than spending agencies, rather than autonomous governments’ (Trench 2010, 
p.573). However, the UK Government has continued to be hesitant in reforming the 
Barnett Formula. In November 2014, for example, David Cameron stated that reform 
was not ‘on the horizon’ and that ‘the best thing to do is to press ahead with fiscal 
devolution, which reduces the significance of the Barnett formula, and build the 
institutions of Wales and Scotland in that way’ (House of Commons Liaison Committee 
2014). Regardless of the strengths and weaknesses of the Barnett Formula and the 
continued debate regarding fiscal arrangements, what is clear is that the absence of 
significant fiscal autonomy and control within Wales has left decision-making around 
funding in the hands of the UK Government. Whilst providing a single set of data for 
the Welsh block grant is difficult, it is clear from the allocation of the Welsh DEL that 
Wales experienced a sustained growth in funding in the pre-crisis period and a fairly 
dramatic decline in funding driven by the UK Government’s austerity agenda (Figures 
1 & 2). Although these fiscal pressures are slightly different from the ‘hard’ 
convergence factors identified in the Eurozone, they provide the context for the 
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attempts of policy actors in Wales to pursue a coherent and potentially distinct 
territorial model. 
 
Figure 3: Total Departmental Expenditure Limits in real terms (2005-06 price levels), 
2001-02 to 2007-08 
 
 
 
Source: HM Treasury (2008) Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (London: TSO) 
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Figure 4: Welsh Departmental Expenditure Limits in real terms (2012-13 price levels), 
2008-09 to 2015-16         
 
 
Source: HM Treasury (2013) Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (London: TSO) 
 
Economic Constraint: Delaying the inevitable or weathering the storm?  
 
The extent to which the Welsh Government and other policy actors in Wales have 
been able to pursue a coherent territorial model within the context of the economic 
crisis reflects wider questions regarding the role of sub-national and regional actors 
within the crisis and the influence of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ forms of convergence and 
divergence. On the wider European scale, the sub-national level has been identified 
as both a potential cause and solution to the crisis (European Commission, 2012, 
2013; Eyrand and Moreno Badia, 2013; Vammalle and Hulbert, 2013). Perhaps most 
notably, the crisis in the Eurozone, and the signing of the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance or Fiscal Compact, has hardened the direct controls 
exercised by Brussels over the functioning of devolved and local governments across 
Europe. These controls, defined as ‘hard’ forms of convergence, have significantly 
reduced the financial flexibility and ‘room for manoeuvre’ of sub-national governments 
(Vammale and Hulbert 2013). Given that Wales lies outside of the Eurozone, it is 
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the same degree in the UK and specifically in terms of the relationship between the 
Welsh Government and UK Government. However, Cole and Stafford (2015, P.21) 
argue that due to the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition Government’s 
response to the crisis, the ‘direction of travel’ within the UK and Wales has been similar 
to the Eurozone experience. The tightening of fiscal rules across the EU was matched 
by a fiscal tightening in the UK as a consequence of the early decisions taken by the 
Coalition government in the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review which committed 
to £81 billion of savings by 2014-15 (HM Treasury, 2010). Indeed, Gamble (2015, 
P.50) notes that in his June 2010 emergency budget, George Osbourne, the new 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, ‘proposed imposing as severe a package of cuts on the 
UK as the Troika (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the 
IMF) was to impose on Greece, Ireland and Portugal.’  
 
The Coalition Government’s commitment that ‘the main burden of deficit reduction  be 
borne by reduced spending rather than increased taxes’ has clearly had a significant 
impact on Wales and the ability of the Welsh Government to pursue its policy agenda 
(HM Government 2010, P.15). In response to the UK Government’s Budget in March 
2015, for example, Jane Hutt, the Welsh Government’s Finance Minister, argued that 
the cuts introduced by the UK Government had been ‘too fast and too deep’ and since 
2010 had led to a cut of 8 per cent or £1.5bn in the Welsh Government’s budget. 
Further, the Minister warned that Osbourne’s commitment to pursue even deeper 
spending cuts following the 2015 General Election ‘would devastate our public 
services in Wales’ (Welsh Government 2015a). The severity of the UK Government’s 
austerity programme led to significant cuts across Whitehall Departments and via the 
Barnett Formula, the Welsh block grant. Crucially, as noted in the previous section, 
this austerity programme contrasted with the ‘milk and honey’ of the first decade of 
devolution, characterised by high levels of economic growth and even higher levels of 
public spending (Drakeford, 2012). Bell (2010, p.60) notes that devolved institutions 
across the UK ‘enjoyed significant increases in public spending’ in areas such as 
health, education and transport and therefore ‘did not have to take unpopular spending 
decisions seriously.’ Indeed, a Welsh Local Government Association (WLGA) official 
interviewed in late November 2012 reflected that prior to the crisis there was ‘lots of 
money flying around’ and funding was often allocated in the Local Government 
settlement ‘without thinking about what outcomes it was trying to achieve’ (UW10).  
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The UK Government and devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales diverged 
sharply in terms of the relative distribution of cuts across policy fields.1 The Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (IFS) (2015, P.153-164), for example, noted that cuts to UK 
Government departmental expenditure limits (DEL) were ‘distributed very unequally 
between departments’. This unevenness of departmental cuts was characterised as 
being driven by a range of interlinked factors. Firstly, the Coalition Government 
identified key policy areas where spending was to be protected, notably the Coalition 
Agreement pledges to increase real spending on the National Health Service (NHS) 
in each year of the 2010-2015 Parliament and to increase spending on overseas aid 
to 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) from 2013 (HM Government 2010). The IFS 
(2015, p.158) noted that the protection of these areas effectively dictated bigger cuts 
in ‘unprotected’ departments, for example, a real cut of 9.5 per cent in overall 
departmental spending resulted in a cut of 20.6 per cent for unprotected departments. 
Secondly, the creation of departmental ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ was exacerbated by the 
Coalition Government’s approach to resource and capital spending. Although the 
relatively low levels of inflation since 2010 effectively made the real cuts to DEL 
smaller, the Coalition Government increased nominal spending on capital DEL in 
some departments, such as the Department for Transport and the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (the ‘winners’), whereas other departments saw either 
resource or capital DEL cuts increase, such as the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice 
and the Ministry of Defence (the ‘losers’). The most severe cuts could be seen in the 
Department of Communities and Local Government, for example, the ‘Local 
Government’ budget element including general and specific grants to local authorities 
was forecast to be cut by 45.5 per cent (IFS 2015, P.161). Lowndes and McCaughie 
(2013, P.546) argue that in responding to these cuts, Local Government in England 
displayed an impressive capacity to ‘reinvent its institutional forms to weather what 
amounts to a perfect storm.’  
                                                          
1
 Comparing the distribution of spending cuts across departments within the context of devolution in the 
UK is difficult given the different definitions of expenditure adopted by the UK Government and devolved 
administrations and the contrasting character of different departments at the UK and devolved levels. 
For example, the policy areas and funding streams controlled by the Department of Communities and 
Local Government at the UK level are not matched like-for-like with a single department within the 
Welsh Government. The analysis of departmental expenditure limits and spending priorities in this 
section are intended to provide an indication of the broad trends in decision-making. 
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In stark contrast to the picture in England, several interviewees noted that Wales, and 
in particular local government in Wales, had been sheltered from the worst of the cuts. 
In April 2013, a senior official within Cardiff Council explained that Wales was 
effectively ‘2 or 3 years behind the curve in terms of having to deal with serious cuts’ 
but that a rebalancing was inevitable (UW20). Despite the Welsh Government’s 
relatively weak range of fiscal powers, it’s almost complete discretion in the allocation 
of the block grant enable it to manage the potential impact of spending cuts across a 
range of public services, including local government budgets. In marked contrast to 
the UK Government and counterparts in Scotland, the Welsh Government rejected the 
model of ‘protected’ or increased spending in health (Drakeford 2012; Deaner and 
Phillips 2013 – See Table 3). A Wales Audit Office official (UW01), interviewed in 
January 2013, provided an overview of the process: 
 
“Given the position that we have, we have a Welsh Government which receives 
a block (grant). That block will shrink. It is no good railing against the darkness. 
You have to make a decision. They will be uncomfortable decisions because 
politically you will not necessary agree with the basis on which those decisions 
started but that is all the money you’ve got. There is no present extra source of 
funds…England has reigned back much more on Local Government than in 
Wales. Decisions have been made to divert the budget for all kinds of good 
reasons. It is not my role, and I would not comment on the choices that the 
Government makes but I do observe this difference.  The result is that the NHS 
is facing a squeeze.” 
 
However, the extent to which this approach could be sustained in the face of further 
cuts to the Welsh block grant driven by the UK Government’s austerity agenda was 
questioned by other interviewees. A Plaid Cymru AM (UW04) acknowledged, for 
example, that ‘devolution to a certain extent has been sold to the public as a kind of 
protective device around public services in Wales’ and delivering on this promise 
would likely become increasingly challenging as the UK Government’s austerity 
programme continued. 
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The Welsh Government’s decision to not ring-fence health spending clearly sheltered 
local public services in Wales from the most severe of the UK Government’s cuts but 
in many senses this strategy can be characterised as simply delaying the inevitable 
rather than representing a coherent territorial response to the crisis. Unsurprisingly the 
WLGA has been particularly vocal in highlighting the potential adverse consequences 
of significant reductions in local government spending (WLGA 2014a). In response to 
the UK Government Autumn Statement in December 2014, the WLGA Spokesperson 
for Finance observed that local government in Wales had been ‘no stranger to 
austerity’ with some local services experiencing budget cuts of over 30 per cent but 
that further cuts would force local authorities to ‘make difficult decisions about 
withdrawing from some services in a way that does least harm to the well-being of our 
citizens’ (WLGA 2014b). This point was made in an interview two years earlier by a 
WLGA official (UW10) who observed that the real ‘nasty stuff’ was still to come and 
that projections provided by IFS suggested that spending power would be reduced by 
almost 20 per cent by 2020-21 (Crawford et al. 2012). The official argued that this level 
of cuts would dictate ‘a radical rethink about of what you have got to deliver’ and the 
need to engage citizens in a dialogue ‘about radical tactical withdrawal from key 
strategic public services.’ However, the difficult choices driven by the UK 
Government’s austerity measures were also shaped by the statutory services that the 
Welsh Government and particularly local authorities were required to deliver. For 
example, in responding to a Welsh Audit Office report on the state of Welsh public 
services, the WLGA’s spokesperson for Regulatory and Frontline Services pointed out 
that ‘over 60% of the local government budget is tied up in protected services like 
education and social care, and this is forcing councils to make further savings in those 
smaller services that have already borne the brunt of public sector austerity in Wales’ 
(WLGA 2014c). Therefore the cuts in local public services have been felt primarily 
within areas like the arts and leisure and preventative health services.  
 
Overall, the Welsh Government and wider policy community within Wales have been 
able to pursue a limited form of ‘soft’ divergence in response to the economic crisis by 
sheltering local government and local public services from the austerity measures 
introduced by the UK Government. However, the relative weakness in political 
capacity, outlined in the previous section, suggests that Wales will increasingly 
struggle to maintain this distinctive policy agenda in the face of ‘hard’ convergence 
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factors in the form of the UK Government’s continued cuts in public spending, for 
example, the 2016 Budget announced further savings of £3.5 billion in 2019-20 (HM 
Treasury 2016).  Furthermore, in the medium to long term the increasing funding gap 
driven by spending cuts promises to be exacerbated by an aging population, relatively 
low productivity and high public expectations (Jeffs 2013; Roberts and Charlesworth 
2014). Therefore the disjuncture between the cost of public services that have 
underpinned the territorial model that has emerged in Wales following devolution and 
the level of funding being provided appears to be widening, not narrowing. 
 
Table 3: Total Welsh Government departmental expenditure, 2010–11 to 2013–14 
(current MEG structure, 2013–14 prices, £ millions) 
 
Main Expenditure 
Group 
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 
(plans) 
% change 
(2010-11 to 
2013-14) 
Health and Social 
Services 
6,387 6,207 6,156 5,941 5,845 -7.0% 
(Health alone) 6,205 6,129 5,992 5,838 5,755 -5.9% 
Local Government 4,694 4,474 4,474 4,493 4,348 -4.3% 
Communities and 
Tackling Poverty 
148 157 160 188 180 27.1% 
Economy, Science 
and Transport 
619 581 540 535 529 -13.6% 
Education and Skills 1,800 1,718 1,726 1,659 1,666 -7.9% 
Natural Resources 
and Food 
314 335 299 327 319 4.1% 
Housing and 
Regeneration 
190 183 176 176 172 -7.2% 
Culture and Sport 125 130 127 125 123 0.1% 
Central Services and 
Administration 
385 352 304 319 318 -17.2% 
Council tax benefit - -  222 - - 
Total (including 
council tax benefit) 
14,662 14,138 13,961 13,985 N/A -4.6% 
Total (excluding 
council tax benefit) 
14,662 14,138 13,961 13,763 13,500 -6.1% 
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Source: B. Deaner and D. Phillips (2013) P.30. 
 
Political Opportunity: Never let a good crisis go to waste!  
 
The financial crisis and associated ‘hard’ convergence factors have clearly had a major 
impact on public services and the direction of policy in Wales but somewhat 
paradoxically the combination of the crisis and other exogenous factors, notably the 
debates around Scottish independence, have opened up a range of political 
opportunities for the devolved administration which may facilitate increased 
divergence in the future. To an extent these exogenous factors can be seen as 
reflecting Kingdon’s (2003) characterisation of ‘policy’ and ‘problem windows’. There 
are at least two main political opportunities that have emerged, firstly the potential 
strengthening of the devolution settlement in Wales and secondly the reform of public 
services and more specifically the reorganisation of local government. However, in 
marked contrast to Kingdon’s characterisation of policy windows as being short in 
duration, the exogenous factors which have provided these opportunities for reform 
have been relatively stable. For example, the wider constitutional questions raised by 
the September 2014 Scottish independence referendum show little sign of leaving the 
political agenda. These political opportunities provide scope both for the strengthening 
of political capacity and potentially the further development of a distinctive territorial 
model.  
 
The paradoxical relationship between the economic crisis and the resulting austerity 
measures on the one hand and the continued development of political capacity and 
devolution in Wales on the other, was reflected in the responses of interviewees. In 
the 2012-13 fieldwork the majority of interviewees across the three cognate groups 
(devolved government or state actors; representatives of professional and policy 
communities; and elected representatives) argued that in fairly broad terms the crisis 
had strengthened the case for the further devolution of responsibilities to Wales. A 
Trade Union official, for example, observed that devolution had provided ‘the 
opportunity to put in place strategies…that would address the worst excesses of the 
economic crisis’ (UW14) Therefore the further transfer of powers and in particular the 
devolution of fiscal powers to the National Assembly for Wales were partly seen as 
providing the devolved administration with greater resources to respond to the crisis. 
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For example, a Welsh Government official noted that the devolution of taxation and 
borrowing powers would provide the Welsh Government with a wider range of policy 
levers and that ‘having more tools in your box seems like a good thing in principle’ 
(UW08). Whether the record of Welsh devolution supported such optimism was 
implicitly questioned by others. A WLGA official contended that the shift to devolve 
further powers could be better understood as part of much wider global process of 
decentralisation and ‘shifting decisions about how services are provided and how 
funding is allocated to as near to the point of delivery as possible’ (UW10). Therefore 
the support for the further devolution of powers had ‘happened irrespective of whether 
or not people actually think that the National Assembly and the Welsh Government is 
particularly effective or good at those interventions, or has had a positive impact on 
alleviating some of the pressures and the impact of the global crisis’ (UW10). 
 
The strengthening of the devolution settlement has therefore perhaps been driven 
more by the ongoing debate within Wales and the wider constitutional debates within 
the UK than the specific policy problems highlighted by the economic crisis. A useful 
illustration of the interaction between these different pressures can be seen in the case 
of the proposed transfer of taxation and borrowing powers. The Holtham and Silk 
Commissions, established in July 2008 and October 2011 respectively, examined the 
introduction of taxation and borrowing powers and the reform of the Barnett formula, 
the latter recommending the partial devolution of income tax powers subject to a 
referendum and a range of smaller taxes (Independent Commission on Funding and 
Finance for Wales 2009, 2010; Commission on Devolution in Wales 2012). The work 
carried out by these two Commissions framed the trajectory of devolution but 
references to Scotland were far away. Gerald Holtham, the chair of the Holtham 
Commission noted that the work of the Commission around the Barnett Formula had 
‘really strengthened the self-confidence of the Welsh administration in its dealings with 
Whitehall’ (UW03). However, he explained that the parallel developments in Scotland 
centred on the Calman Commission’s review of Scottish devolution and notably 
financial accountability had benefited his Commission’s work in Wales:  
 
‘I think we were lucky in that in following Calman, a lot of the initial thinking and 
ground clearing they had done. We had the advantage of being able to look at it 
and say yes its right, or where are the holes? And then we were able to focus 
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and fill in the holes in a sense, you know, there were certain aspects where their 
analysis just stopped short and they just hadn’t done it, but that in a sense 
enabled us to focus on the areas they hadn’t worked on, and take some of the 
technical aspects a bit further. So that was helpful’ (UW03). 
 
Similarly, Paul Silk, the chair of the Silk Commission, portrayed the Commission’s 
proposals around the further transfer of borrowing powers as being cast in the wider 
UK and European setting:   
‘Our borrowing recommendations, to use the great Gordon Brown, were prudent 
and really set in the sort of context of what Scotland has already got, what 
Northern Ireland has already got and what Local Authorities have already got. 
We did not think that that was an extravagant sort of free-for-all rampaging Welsh 
Government delving into the difficulties…as Spanish regions have done’ (UW16). 
 
Furthermore, exogenous factors refocused attention on territorial politics and therefore 
opened up a political window for the reform of the devolution settlement in Wales. In 
his speech in the immediate aftermath of the narrow ‘no’ vote, the Prime Minister David 
Cameron, stated that ‘a new and fair settlement for Scotland should be accompanied 
by a new and fair settlement that applies to all parts of our United Kingdom’ and that 
Wales should be ‘at the heart of the debate on how to make our United Kingdom work 
for all our nations’ (Cameron 2014). Although not the strongest supporters of 
devolution in its first decade, the Conservative Party’s 2015 General Election 
Manifesto included a tranche of reforms empowering the Assembly and the Welsh 
Government, notably a commitment to devolving taxation powers in order ‘to make the 
Welsh Government responsible for raising more of the money it spends so the Welsh 
people can hold their politicians to account’ (Conservative Party 2015, P.70-71).  
 
Although there was a widely held perception among interviewees that the appetite for 
greater devolution had not been fundamentally underpinned or undermined by the 
economic crisis, several interviewees pointed out that the crisis had weakened any 
desire to follow Scotland’s path towards independence. A Wales Office official argued 
that the economic crisis had highlighted that ‘smaller economies would have great 
difficulty’ in responding to the crisis and therefore an independent Wales would have 
struggled to cope (UW17). Perhaps unsurprisingly a report co-authored by the Plaid 
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Cymru AM, Adam Price, provided a more optimistic picture for Wales and other small 
countries within the global economy (Price and Levinger, 2011). Price and Levinger 
(2011, p.62) argue that rather than being at greater risk of ‘capsizing’ during the storm, 
‘small countries can be said to behave more like the woodchip – tossed about on the 
waves – but difficult to sink.’ However, a fellow Plaid Cymru AM observed that due to 
the crisis ‘it’s going to be even more difficult to try and persuade the public to approve 
of powers coming through to Wales, particularly around tax or borrowing…if the public 
as a whole feel that member states are not coping very well - in the Euro zone certainly 
not coping very well with the recession’ (UW04). Therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
the primary response within Wales to the economic crisis and associated austerity 
measures was not an increased appetite for independence but rather the far-reaching 
reform of the delivery of public services. Wallace et al. (2013, p.9) provide a useful 
reference point for this reform process, identifying four potential strategies that could 
be adopted by countries comparable in size to Wales in response to the crisis: 
  
1. Rethinking – new, whole-systems approaches to public services 
2. Reforming – new ways of delivering specific public services 
3. Restructuring – new ways of organising public services 
4. Retrenching – reduction or removal of public services 
 
Wallace et al. (2013, p.11) developed a similar argument to Katzenstein (1985), 
hypothesising that ‘smaller jurisdictions should find it easier to develop a coherent, 
whole-systems plan for future public services’ defined by a ‘golden thread’ linking 
different aspects of public service reform to a holistic strategy. However, they 
concluded that it was difficult to locate ‘a system that was fully integrated and delivering 
more than the sum of its parts’ in any of the case studies considered in their analysis 
(Wallace et al. 2013, P.12). 
 
Whilst the economic and fiscal crisis can be characterised as a relatively weak factor 
in driving the constitutional development of devolution in Wales and the austerity 
measures introduced by the UK Government have been softened in the Welsh context, 
the crisis acted as a catalyst in terms of the debate regarding the need to reform public 
service delivery. A Welsh Government official observed that the crisis had ‘accelerated 
the pace of change in terms of public service delivery in Wales’. The official explained 
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that ‘political parties in general have talked big about public service delivery reform 
since devolution began but the changes have been relatively modest’ (UW15). The 
Welsh Labour Party’s 2011 Assembly manifesto stressed that that ‘delivery will be 
Welsh Labour’s watchword in the fourth Assembly term’ and put forward a range of 
organisational reforms including the creation of a First Minister’s Delivery Unit, a pan-
Wales Public Policy Institute and an Independent Review of the Governance of Wales 
to explore a model of improved public service delivery in Wales. (Welsh Labour, 2011, 
p.22). The latter was fulfilled via the creation in April 2013 of the Independent 
Commission on Public Service Governance and Delivery, chaired by Sir Paul Williams. 
A Welsh Government official explained that the explicit role of the Commission was to 
get ‘more bang for our buck against the backdrop of declining budgets’ (UW15). The 
Commission’s final report, published in January 2014, recommended the creation of 
larger local authority units, arguing that it provided ‘the best option for addressing the 
risks of small scale and indeed the only one that is both viable and deliverable in the 
short to medium term’ (Commission on Public Service Governance and Delivery 2014, 
p.88). However, it is one thing to recommend the reorganisation of local government 
and quite another to deliver it. 
 
The Welsh Government’s initial response to the Commission’s report highlighted its 
readiness to engage in rethinking, reforming and restructuring strategies in relation to 
public services and local government in Wales (Welsh Government 2014a, 2014b). 
The Welsh Government (2014a, p.9) stated that: 
 
‘Doing the same things as we do now is not sustainable in the face of changing 
demands and the deep and prolonged cuts to public sector budgets across the 
UK. We must act to change the way public services work – individually, 
collectively and with people.’ 
 
The Welsh Government’s (2014b) strategic vision for the future of public services 
encompassed a wide range of initiatives designed to respond to the Commission’s 
findings, including the integration of public services into ‘one public service’ (P.17), a 
revised model of public services ‘delivered with rather than to the public’ (P.21 – bold 
in original) and a reorganisation of local government to be pursued via ‘a series of local 
authority mergers within the context of a wide-ranging programme of local government 
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reform’ (P.12). Historically local government reform has been slow, costly and highly 
politicised, creating winners and losers – the latter who ‘retreat sulking to their tents 
and prepare to fight for the reversal of their losses’ (Elcock 1998, p.191). Therefore 
the Welsh Government faces a major challenge in avoiding the same pitfalls of the 
1996 reorganisation (Thomas 1994; Pemberton 2000). Unsurprisingly the WLGA has 
stressed the costs of reorganisation, including up to £158m in people change and 
redundancy costs, up to £54m in the rationalisation of property, systems and other 
change management costs and £57m of income that will be forgone due to council tax 
harmonisation (WLGA 2014d). However, the Welsh Government has demonstrated a 
clear commitment to take advantage of the policy window that has been opened up by 
the combination of the austerity programme sparked by the financial crisis and 
increasing demands on public services.  
 
Overall, the economic crisis has clearly provided, either directly or indirectly, a range 
of political opportunities for devolution in Wales. On the one hand it has added to the 
momentum around the further development of devolution via the Silk Commission and 
more fundamental debate regarding the future shape of the UK, and on the other it 
has provided a key underpinning rationale for the reform of public services and local 
government. The different dimensions considered in this section appear to tie into 
different elements of the ‘states of convergence’ typology. The reform of public 
services within Wales can be characterised as a form of ‘soft’ convergence, primarily 
driven by the Welsh Government’s search for best practice, but this reform agenda 
also displays characteristics of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ divergence, shaped by the specific 
challenges and needs of Wales and a reluctance to pursue alternative models, notably 
England. However, what is clear is that Wales’ experience of the economic crisis is 
not simply a tale of ‘hard convergence’ characterised by ‘top-down’ intrusive measures 
implemented by the UK or EU levels.  
 
Conclusion: Towards a Welsh territorial model?  
 
The key overarching question explored within this paper has been the extent to which 
devolved actors in Wales have been able to pursue a distinctive policy response to the 
financial crisis or whether factors, potentially exogenous or endogenous, have driven 
policy convergence. Further, there is a significant strand within the existing literature 
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that suggests that not only can small states or sub-national actors, such as Wales, 
pursue their own distinctive territorial models but their size and character may actually 
provide an advantage in responding to crises (Katzenstein 1985). Katzenstein (1985, 
p.11) argues that ‘small corporatist states can continue to prosper – not because they 
have found a solution to the problem of change but because they have found a way to 
live with change’. This argument has been examined in recent research exploring the 
experience of small states in the global economic crisis and attempts to justify a 
specific Welsh response (Verdun 2013; Thorhallsson and Kattel 2013; Price and 
Levinger 2011; Wallace et al. 2013). The UK’s position outside of the Eurozone has 
meant that Wales has not been subject to the ‘hard’ convergence pressures which 
have increasingly constrained sub-national actors across Europe and although Wales 
has faced increasing economic constraints and fiscal pressures akin to ‘hard’ 
convergence due to the UK Government’s austerity programme, it was able to shelter 
local public services in the short term. Further, the economic crisis has acted as a 
catalyst for the opening of policy windows in terms of both the development of 
devolution and the reform of public services.  
 
The future of devolution in Wales is perhaps even more difficult to gauge following the 
2015 General Election and ongoing debates around the constitutional future of the UK. 
On the day after securing a narrow majority, David Cameron stressed his intention to 
implement reforms to devolution across the UK as quickly as possible and that ‘the 
governments of these nations will become more powerful, with wider responsibilities’ 
(Cameron 2015). Although this provides a relatively optimistic picture of the future 
strengthening of devolution in Wales and therefore a greater ability to explore a Welsh 
territorial model, the delivery of this agenda and other elements of the Conservative 
Party’s 2015 Election Manifesto provide a gloomier picture. The draft Wales Bill, 
published in October 2015, was widely criticised during pre-legislative scrutiny, for 
example, the former Presiding Officer of the National Assembly and Plaid Cymru AM, 
Dafydd Elis-Thomas stated that ‘of the five attempts to re-write the constitution of 
Wales in my time in public life, going back to 1978, this is the worst’ (Wales Online 
2015). A revised draft Wales Bill was reintroduced in June 2016 and the process is 
effectively due to start again. In addition, the in-out referendum on the UK’s 
membership of the EU due to take place in June 2016 and significant further cuts to 
departmental spending and social security could significantly impact Wales and the 
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Welsh Government’s ability to pursue policy divergence or a holistic ‘rethinking’ of 
public services (Crawford et al. 2015). Therefore using Katzenstein’s terms whilst it 
could be argued that actors in Wales have worked hard to ‘live with change’ and 
counter the worse effects of the economic crisis, the scope to pursue a Welsh territorial 
model may become increasingly constrained by exogenous factors.  
 
 
 
Appendix 1: List of Interviews – November 2012-July 2013 
 
UW01 Welsh Audit Office Official, Cardiff, 15 January 2013 
UW02 Federation of Small Businesses Official, Cardiff, 11 January 2013 
UW03 Gerald Holtham, Chair of the Independent Commission on Funding and 
Finance for Wales, Cardiff, 13 December 2012  
UW04 Plaid Cymru AM, Cardiff, 16 January 2013 
UW05 The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) Cymru 
Official, Cardiff, 16 January 2013 
UW06 Liberal Democrat AM, Cardiff, 23 January 2013 
UW07 Welsh Joint Education Committee (WJEC) Official, Cardiff, 3 December 2012 
UW08 Senior Finance Official, Welsh Government, Cardiff, 19 February 2013 
UW09 Conservative AM, Telephone Interview, 27 February 2013 
UW10 Director of Resources, Welsh Local Government Association, Cardiff, 29 
November 2012 
UW11 Plaid Cymru AM, Cardiff, 5 February 2013 
UW12 Leighton Andrews, Minister for Education and Labour AM, Cardiff, 24 January 
2013 
UW13 Councillor Ali Thomas, Neath & Port Talbot Council leader and WLGA 
spokesman for education, Port Talbot, 29 January 2013 
UW14 National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers (NASUWT) 
Wales Official, Cardiff, 12 February 2013 
UW15 First Minister’s Principal Private Secretary, Welsh Government, Cardiff, 10 
May 2013 
UW16 Paul Silk, Chair of the Commission on Devolution in Wales, Cardiff, 21 March 
2013 
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UW17 Senior Official, Wales Office, Cardiff, 4 March 2013 
UW18 National Union of Teachers (NUT) Official, Cardiff, 13 March 2013 
UW19 Conservative AM, Cardiff, 25 April 2013 
UW20 Chief Operating Officer, Cardiff Council, Cardiff, 23 April 2013 
UW21 Labour AM, Telephone Interview, 26 July 2013 
UW22 Institute of Directors Official, Cardiff, 8 July 2013 
UW23 Liberal Democrat AM, Cardiff, 18 July 2013 
UW24 Undeb Cenedlaethol Athrawon Cymru (UCAC) Official, Cardiff, 20 May 2013 
UW25 Director of Lifelong Learning, Leisure and Information, WLGA 
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